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Abstract
This paper examines the hypothesis that firms in competitive industries should benefit
relatively less from good governance, while firms in non-competitive industries–where lack of
competitive pressure fails to enforce discipline on managers–should benefit relatively more.
Whether we look at the eﬀects of governance on long-horizon stock returns, firm value, or
operating performance, we consistently find the same pattern: The eﬀect is monotonic in the
degree of competition, it is small and insignificant in competitive industries, and it is large
and significant in non-competitive industries. By implication, the eﬀect of governance (in
non-competitive industries) reported in this paper is stronger than what has been previously
reported in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003, “GIM”) and subsequent work, who document
the average eﬀect across all industries. For instance, GIM’s hedge portfolio–provided it only
includes firms in non-competitive industries–earns a monthly alpha of 1.47%, which is twice
as large as the alpha reported in GIM. The alpha remains large and significant even if the
sample period is extended until 2006. We also revisit the argument that investors in the
1990s anticipated the eﬀect of governance, implying that the alpha earned by GIM’s hedge
portfolio is likely due to an omitted risk factor. We find that while investors were indeed
not surprised on average, they underestimated the eﬀect of governance in non-competitive
industries, the very industries in which governance has a significant eﬀect in the first place.
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1 Introduction
Do all firms benefit from good corporate governance? While this question may sound like
blasphemy in the ears of shareholder-rights activists, it is not without substance. Going back
to Adam Smith, economists have long argued that managerial incentive problems are first and
foremost an issue for firms in non-competitive industries. As Sir John Hicks succinctly put
it, managers of such firms tend to enjoy the “quiet life”.1 By contrast, managers of firms in
competitive industries are under constant pressure to reduce slack and improve eﬃciency, or
else they will not survive. Hence, survival of the fittest, the quintessential Darwinian concept,
ensures that managers in competitive industries have little choice but to maximize firm value:2
“Over the long pull, there is one simple criterion for the survival of a business en-
terprise: Profits must be nonnegative. No matter how strongly managers prefer to
pursue other objectives [...] failure to satisfy this criterion means ultimately that a
firm will disappear from the economic scene.” (Scherer, 1980)
That firms benefit from good corporate governance on average is well established. In an
influential paper, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003, henceforth “GIM”) demonstrate that firms
with good governance earn significantly higher stock returns. The authors construct a hedge
portfolio that is long in firms with good governance (“Democracy firms”) and short in firms
with bad governance (“Dictatorship firms”). Over a 10-year horizon (1990 to 1999), this hedge
portfolio earns a monthly alpha of 0.67%, which corresponds to an annual alpha of about 8.5%.
Governance is measured via an index (“G-index”) consisting of 24 (anti-)governance provisions.
In addition to showing that good governance is associated with higher stock returns, GIM also
show that it is positively related to firm value and operating performance.3
1“The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life” (Hicks (1935)). Similarly, Adam Smith (1776) writes that
“Monopoly [. . . ] is a great enemy to good management”.
2This (extreme) version of the notion that product market competition reduces managerial slack, based on
survivorship, is due to Alchian (1950), Friedman (1953), and Stigler (1958). A formal model along these lines has
been developed by Winter (1971).
3The latter evidence is not causal, though the authors do examine alternative hypotheses and find no evidence
that their results are driven by either reverse causality or an omitted variable bias. However, other papers have
shown that governance–proxied for by the passage of state takover laws–has a causal eﬀect on firms’ operating
performance (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003); Giroud and Mueller (2008)).
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If managers of firms in competitive industries have little choice but to maximize firm value,
then firms in such industries should benefit relatively less from good governance. In contrast,
firms in non-competitive industries, where lack of competitive pressure fails to enforce discipline
on managers, should benefit relatively more. The evidence presented in this paper supports this
hypothesis. Whether we look at the eﬀects of governance on stock returns, firm value, or oper-
ating performance, we consistently find that the eﬀect is small and insignificant in competitive
industries, while it is large and significant in non-competitive industries.4 By construction, since
the results in GIM and subsequent work document the average eﬀect across all industries, this
implies that the eﬀects of governance (in non-competitive industries) reported in this paper are
stronger than what has been previously documented. On a practical note, our results imply
that researchers who want to investigate the eﬀects of governance could benefit from interacting
governance with measures of competition. In fact, researchers might find that governance has
a strong and significant eﬀect in non-competitive industries even if the average eﬀect across all
industries is small and insignificant (see below for examples).
Our main measure of competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (“HHI”). The index is
computed for each of the 48 Fama-French (1997) industries based on all firms in the Compustat
universe. We construct hedge portfolios by dividing both the Democracy (G-index of 5 or less)
and Dictatorship (G-index of 14 or higher) portfolios each into equal-sized portfolios based on
whether the HHI lies in the lowest, medium, or highest tercile of its empirical distribution. For
each HHI tercile, we then form a hedge portfolio that is long in the respective Democracy port-
folio and short in the respective Dictatorship portfolio. For the original sample period in GIM
(1990 to 1999), we find that the alpha earned by the hedge portfolio is small and insignificant
in the lowest HHI tercile (competitive industries), it is larger and marginally significant in the
medium HHI tercile, and it is largest and significant in the highest HHI tercile (non-competitive
industries). For instance, the alpha in the highest HHI tercile is 1.47% per month, which is
approximately twice as large as the alpha reported in GIM.
This pattern is robust across many specifications. Whether we use diﬀerent competition
measures (e.g., measures provided by the Census Bureau, which include all public and private
4Using the passage of state takeover laws as a source of exogenous variation, Giroud and Mueller (2008) find
that these laws have no eﬀect on firms’ operating performance in competitive industries, while they have a strong
eﬀect on firms in non-competitive industries. Their paper does not consider firm-level governance mechanisms,
however, nor does it consider the eﬀect of governance on either long-horizon stock returns or firm value.
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firms), diﬀerent governance measures (e.g., the E-index by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005)
or the ATI by Cremers and Nair (2005)), or whether we extend the sample period until 2006,
the alpha is always monotonic in the HHI, it is always small and insignificant in the lowest HHI
tercile, and it is always large and significant in the highest HHI tercile. The latter robustness
check–extending the sample period until 2006–is particularly interesting, as it has been shown
that the original results of GIM all but disappear when the sample period is extended beyond
1999. When we extend the sample period until 2006, we do indeed find that the alpha is
small and insignificant on average. However, the alpha remains large (0.99%) and significant
in the highest HHI tercile. Overall, our results strenghten GIM’s findings that governance-
based trading strategies earn significant abnormal returns, especially if they focus on firms in
non-competitive industries.
A valid question is whether the significant abnormal returns in the highest HHI tercile are
driven by industry eﬀects and not by corporate governance. We examine this possibility using
both industry-adjusted returns and a five-factor model that includes the HHI as an additional
risk factor. The results remain virtually unchanged. Another issue, and one that is already
present in GIM’s original study, is whether the results could be driven by an omitted variable
bias. Such a bias could arise if governance provisions are correlated with firm or other (risk)
characteristics that were priced during the sample period but that are not captured by the asset
pricing model used to calculate abnormal returns. To address this issue, we follow GIM and
estimate Fama-MacBeth return regressions that include a broad array of control variables. The
picture is similar to before. The eﬀect of governance on stock returns is monotonic in the HHI,
it is small and insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile, and it is large and significant in the highest
HHI tercile.
There are two potential explanations for the abnormal returns earned by the Democracy-
Dictatorship hedge portfolio.5 One is an omitted variable bias. As we have stated above, and
consistent with GIM’s own findings, we find no evidence for this hypothesis. The other expla-
nation is that weak governance gives rise to agency costs whose magnitude was underestimated
by investors. Consistent with the first part of this hypothesis, GIM find that weak governance
is associated with both higher capital expenditures and higher acquisition activity, while Core,
5GIM also propose a third explanation, which is based on reverse causality: Managers who rationally anticipate
the poor future performance of their companies adopt takeover defenses and weaken shareholder rights to shield
their jobs from shareholder activism and hostile takeovers. GIM find no evidence for this hypothesis.
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Guay, and Rusticus (2006) and GIM both find that weak governance is associated with lower
operating performance. However, Core, Guay, and Rusticus find no evidence for the second part
of the hypothesis, namely, that investors were surprised. The authors test whether the stock
market underperformance of weak governance firms is due to investor surprise about the poor
operating performance of these firms. Using analysts’ earnings forecasts to proxy for investors’
expectations, they find no significant relation between governance and forecast errors (diﬀerence
between actual and forecasted earnings per share (EPS)).
Consistent with Core, Guay, and Rusticus’ results, we (also) find that the average forecast
error is small and insignificant. However, when we–based on our previous findings–examine
how this result varies across HHI terciles, we obtain a more nuanced picture. First, we find that
good governance firms exhibit significantly higher EPS only when competition is weak. Second,
and this is remarkable, analysts seem to understand that good governance has a positive eﬀect
only in non-competitive industries. While the diﬀerence in forecasted EPS between good and
bad governance firms is small and insignificant in the lowest and medium HHI terciles, it is large
and significant in the highest HHI tercile. However, and herein lies the crux, analysts seem
to underestimate the magnitude of the eﬀect of good governance on EPS in non-competitive
industries. While the forecast error is small and insignificant in the lowest and medium HHI
terciles, it is positive and significant in the highest HHI tercile. Thus, analysts underestimate
the eﬀect of good governance on EPS in precisely those industries in which governance matters
for EPS. Whether this forecast error is large enough to fully explain the abnormal returns is an
open question. At a minimum, it provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that investors
were surprised, which is consistent with GIM’s interpretation of their findings.
We next consider the eﬀect of governance on firm value (Tobin’s Q). We estimate cross-
sectional regressions of industry-adjusted Q on the G-index (or the G-index interacted with
HHI dummies) and controls for each year from 1990 to 2006. Consistent with GIM’s results,
we find that governance has a significant positive eﬀect on firm value in 14 out of 17 years.
Interestingly, the estimates after 1999 are similar to those before, suggesting that the relation
between governance and firm value does not weaken after 1999. When we examine how this
result varies across HHI terciles, we obtain the same pattern as before. The eﬀect of governance
on firm value is monotonic in the HHI in most years (13 out of 17 years), it is always small and
insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile, and it is always positive, economically large, and almost
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always significant (16 out of 17 years) in the highest HHI tercile. We obtain the same picture
for the overall sample period (1990 to 2006) when using either the Fama-MacBeth methodology
or a panel regression with fixed eﬀects and clustered standard errors.
We finally consider the eﬀect of governance on firms’ operating performance, measured by
the return on assets (ROA), net profit margin (NPM), and return on equity (ROE). In all
three cases, we find that governance has on average a positive eﬀect on operating performance,
although the eﬀect is only significant for ROA and NPM.6 When we examine how these results
vary across HHI terciles, we obtain the same picture as before. The eﬀect of governance on
operating performance is always monotonic in the HHI, it is always small and insignificant in
the lowest HHI tercile, and it is always large and significant in the highest HHI tercile. This is
true even for ROE, where the average eﬀect is insignificant. Overall, our results regarding firm
value and operating performance are consistent with those obtained in the context of equity
returns. While governance appears to matter only little in competitive industries, it has a
positive and significant eﬀect in non-competitive industries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides
summary statistics on the empirical relation between the G-index and the HHI. Section 3 ex-
amines the eﬀect of governance on equity returns. Section 4 examines the eﬀect on firm value
and operating performance. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Sample Selection and Definition of Variables
Our sample consists of all companies in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)
universe that have a match in both CRSP and Compustat. We exclude all firms with dual-class
shares.7 To match firms to industries, we require a non-missing SIC code in Compustat. Over
the sample period from 1990 to 2006, this leaves us with 3, 241 companies.
Our measure of corporate governance is the Governance Index (“G-index”) developed by
GIM. The index is constructed by adding one index point for each of the 24 (anti-)corporate
governance provisions listed in GIM. Higher index values indicate weaker corporate governance.
6That the (average) eﬀect of governance on ROE is insignificant is consistent with GIM’s results.
7See GIM, footnote 5.
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GIM refer to companies with a G-index of 5 or less as “Democracies” and to companies with a
G-index of 14 or higher as “Dictatorships”. The G-index is obtained from the IRRC database
and is available for the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 during the
sample period. For intermediate years, we use the index value from the latest available year.
In robustness checks, we will also use the Entrenchment Index (“E-index”) by Bebchuk, Cohen,
and Ferrell (2005) and the Alternative Takeover Index (“ATI”) by Cremers and Nair (2005).
The E-index consists of 6 out of the 24 provisions listed in GIM. The ATI is based on only 3
provisions.8 We construct the E-index and the ATI using IRRC data. The correlations between
all three indices are high. Using all IRRC years, the correlation between the G-index and the
E-index is 0.71, the correlation between the G-index and the ATI is 0.68, and the correlation
between the E-index and the ATI is 0.76.
Our measure of product market competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (“HHI”).
The index is computed as the sum of squared market shares,
HHIjt :=
XNj
i=1
s2ijt,
where sijt is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t. Market shares are computed
from Compustat using firms’ sales (item #12). When computing the HHI, we use all firms in
the Compustat universe. We exclude firm-year observations for which sales are either missing
or negative. The HHI is a commonly used measure in the empirical IO literature and is well
grounded in theory (Curry and George (1983); Tirole (1988, pp. 221-223)). In robustness checks,
we will also use the four-firm concentration ratio, which is the sum of market shares of the four
largest firms in an industry. This measure is also common in the empirical IO literature and is
routinely used by government agencies.
We classify industries using the 48 industry classification scheme by Fama and French (1997,
henceforth FF). We assign each company to an industry by matching the SIC codes of Compustat
to the 48 FF industries using the conversion table in the Appendix of FF. We obtain similar
results if we use alternative industry partitions, such as the Standard Industry Classification
(SIC), the North-American Industry Classification System (NAICS), and the Global Industry
8For the E-index, we use a cutoﬀ of E = 0 for Democracy firms and E ≥ 4 for Dictatorship firms. Using
a cutoﬀ of E ≥ 4 ensures that the Dictatorship portfolio contains suﬃciently many companies relative to the
Democracy portfolio (see Table II in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005)). For the ATI, we use a cutoﬀ of ATI
= 0 for Democracy firms and ATI ≥ 2 for Dictatorship firms.
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Classification Standard (GICS).9
Since our competition measures are computed from Compustat, they only include publicly
traded companies. In robustness checks, we will alternatively use competition measures provided
by the Census Bureau (HHI and four-firm concentration ratio, respectively), which include all
public and private firms in the U.S. Despite this appealing feature, the measures provided by the
Census Bureau have some serious drawbacks. First, they are only available for manufacturing
industries.10 Second, they are only computed every five years. Since our sample ranges from
1990 to 2006, we use data from the 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002 Censuses. For intermediate
years, we use the data from the latest available Census. Third, the measures are not available
for the 48 FF industries. In the 1987 and 1992 Censuses, they are only available for 4-digit
SIC industries. In 1997, the Census Bureau switched from SIC to NAICS codes and began to
provide competition measures for various NAICS partitions. In our empirical analysis, we use
4-digit SIC codes before 1997 and 4-digit NAICS codes after 1997. We obtain similar results if
we use 5- or 6-digit NAICS codes after 1997.
We will also use data from CRSP, CDA Spectrum, I/B/E/S, and other sources. The respec-
tive variables are all standard in the finance literature and will be introduced later.
2.2 Empirical Relation between the G-index and the HHI
Using all firm-year observations from 1990 to 2006, the correlation between the G-index and the
HHI is virtually zero.11 (The correlation is 0.00 with a p−value of 0.50.) Since the HHI is an
industry measure, we can also compute the correlation at the industry level. Here, we obtain a
weakly negative correlation of −0.06 (p−value of 0.08) between the HHI and the mean G-index
of an industry.12 Since our analysis is entirely at the firm level, however, the relevant correlation
from our perspective is at the firm level.
9The NAICS and GICS codes can be obtained from the Prices, Dividends, and Earnings file of Compustat.
10From 1997 onward, the four-firm concentration ratio is available for all NAICS industries, except mining,
construction, and management of companies and enterprises. To avoid that our results are driven by changes in
industry composition, we use this measure only for manufacturing industries. However, we have verified that our
results are similar if we use all available industries.
11This has been already noted by GIM (p. 119), who write that “[t]here is no obvious industry concentration
among these top firms [in the Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios].”
12This is consistent with findings by Cremers, Nair, and Peyer (2008).
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Table I provides detailed statistics. Panel (A) includes all firms in the Democracy and
Dictatorship portfolios. For each of these two portfolios, we sort firms into quintiles based on
their HHIs. The comparison of interest is between firms in the Democracy and Dictatorship
portfolios that lie in the same HHI quintile. As is shown, the distribution of the HHI in the
Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios is virtually identical. For example, firms in the lowest
HHI quintile of the Democracy portfolio have a mean (median) HHI of 0.02 (0.02), as do firms
in the lowest HHI quintile of the Dictatorship portfolio. Likewise, the range of observed HHI
values in the lowest quintile is [0.01, 0.03] in either of the two portfolios. The picture is similar
in the other four quintiles.
Panel (B) includes all firms, not just those in the Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios,
and sorts them into HHI quintiles. As is shown, the mean G-index is similar and the median
G-index is identical in all five quintiles. Importantly, there is no systematic trend. Starting
from the lowest quintile, the mean G-index first decreases, then it increases twice, and then it
decreases. The mean G-index in the highest HHI quintile is 9.19, which is close to the value
in the lowest quintile (9.22). The range of observed G-index values is also similar across HHI
quintiles. Eﬀectively, this means that it does not matter whether we sort firms first by their
G-index and then by their HHIs, or the other way around.
We obtain similar bivariate statistics if we use either the E-index or the ATI instead of the
G-index, if we use the HHI provided by the Census Bureau instead of the HHI computed from
Compustat, and if we restrict the sample to the original period in GIM (1990 to 1999) or the
post-GIM period (2000 to 2006).
3 Return Regressions
3.1 Trading Strategies
This section examines the performance of trading strategies that are jointly based on corporate
governance and product market competition. To compute abnormal returns, we use Carhart’s
(1997) four-factor model. The abnormal return is the intercept α of the regression
Rt = α+ β1 ×RMRFt + β2 × SMBt + β3 ×HMLt + β4 × UMDt + εt, (1)
where Rt is the excess return on a given portfolio in month t, RMRFt is the return on the
market portfolio minus the risk-free rate, SMBt is the size factor (small minus big), HMLt
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is the book-to-market factor (high minus low), and UMDt is the momentum factor (up minus
down). To construct portfolio returns, we use monthly returns from CRSP. The RMRF , SMB
and HML factors are taken from Kenneth French’s website, while UMD is computed using the
procedure described in Carhart (1997).
GIM construct a hedge portfolio that is long in the Democracy portfolio (firms with a G-
index of 5 or less) and short in the Dictatorship portfolio (firms with a G-index of 14 or higher).
To analyze the joint eﬀect of governance and competition, we divide both the Democracy and
Dictatorship portfolio each into equal-sized portfolios based on HHI terciles. This leaves us
with 2× 3 = 6 portfolios: one Democracy portfolio and one Dictatorship portfolio for each HHI
tercile.13 For each HHI tercile, we then construct a hedge portfolio analogous to GIM that is
long in the respective Democracy portfolio and short in the respective Dictatorship portfolio.
In our benchmark analysis, we also construct hedge portfolios based on two (instead of three)
HHI groups.14
To allow a comparison with GIM’s results, we use the same sample period, namely, from
September 1990 to December 1999 (112 monthly returns). In robustness checks, we will extend
the sample period until December 2006. Analogous to GIM, we rebalance all portfolios in
September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 1998, which are the months after which new
IRRC data became available. To incorporate new values of the HHI, we additionally rebalance
all portfolios each July using the HHI computed from sales in the previous fiscal year.15 We
always report the results both for value-weighted and equally-weighted portfolios. To compute
the value-weighted return on a portfolio in month t, we weight each individual return with the
stock’s market capitalization at the end of month t− 1.
Main Results
Table II contains our main results. In the first row of Panel (A), we report the original
results by GIM. For value-weighted portfolios, GIM find that the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge
13Our results are virtually unchanged if we sort firms first by their HHIs and then according to whether they
are Democracy or Dictatorship firms. This is not surprising given that the correlation between the HHI and the
G-index on the firm level is virtually zero.
14We obtain similar results if we form hedge portfolios based on HHI quartiles. We use HHI terciles as our
preferred partition to ensure that each portfolio contains suﬃciently many companies.
15We obtain similar results if we use the HHI from the fiscal year t− 2 or a moving average of the HHIs over
the previous three fiscal years.
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portfolio earns a monthly alpha of 0.71% (t = 2.73). In the second row, we replicate GIM’s
results. The alpha (0.69%, t = 2.71) and factor loadings are similar, albeit not identical.16 In
the third row, we exclude all companies with missing SIC codes.17 This is the sample we will
use in our analysis. The alpha (0.66%, t = 2.57) and factor loadings are again similar, which
suggests that the excluded companies are not diﬀerent from the rest.
In Panel (B), we report the abnormal returns to the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolios
based on individual HHI groups. All portfolios are value-weighted. If we form hedge portfolios
based on two HHI groups, we find that the alpha is small (0.43%) and insignificant in the below-
median HHI group (competitive industries), while it is large (1.08%) and significant (t = 3.13)
in the above-median HHI group. A similar picture emerges if we form hedge portfolios based on
three HHI groups. The alpha is small (0.30%) and insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile, it is
larger (0.64%) and marginally significant (t = 1.70) in the medium HHI tercile, and it is largest
(1.47%) and significant (t = 3.38) in the highest HHI tercile.18
There are two ways how to interpret our results. One interpretation is that governance-
based trading strategies are ineﬀective in competitive industries. The other interpretation,
which is merely the other side of the coin, is that governance-based trading strategies are highly
eﬀective in non-competitive industries. In fact, since the alphas in GIM are averages across
all industries, our results show that governance-based trading strategies, provided they focus
on non-competitive industries, are more eﬀective than previously documented. For instance, a
governance-based trading strategy that focuses on firms in the top HHI tercile earns a monthly
alpha of 1.47%, which is more than twice the alpha reported in GIM.
In Panel (C), we report the abnormal returns for equally-weighted portfolios. As in GIM, all
results are weaker. For equally-weighted portfolios, GIM find that the Democracy-Dictatorship
hedge portfolio earns a monthly alpha of 0.45% (t = 2.05). When replicating their results
(excluding companies with missing SIC codes), we obtain an alpha of 0.48% (t = 2.19) (not
reported in Table II). Importantly, the basic pattern across HHI groups is similar to that in
16The alpha and factor loadings are, however, identical to those in Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006, p. 682).
17The Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios in GIM include 572 companies. Excluding companies with
missing SIC codes leaves us with 564 companies.
18We obtain similar results if we form hedge portfolios based on four HHI groups. The alphas are monotonic
in the HHI and only significant in the highest two HHI quartiles. As remarked previously, we use HHI terciles as
our benchmark partition to ensure that each portfolio contains suﬃciently many companies.
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Panel (B). If we form hedge portfolios based on two HHI groups, we find that the alpha is small
and insignificant in the below-median HHI group, while it is large and significant in the above-
median HHI group. The picture is similar if we form hedge portfolios based on three HHI groups.
The alpha is small (0.28%) and insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile, it is larger (0.42%) and
(still) insignificant in the medium HHI tercile, and it is largest (0.72%) and significant (t = 2.38)
in the highest HHI tercile.
A valid question is whether the significant alphas in the highest HHI tercile are driven by
industry eﬀects and not by corporate governance. While we will investigate this issue in more
detail below, let us already notice here that this is rather unlikely. Recall from Panel (A) of Table
I that the various Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolios based on individual HHI groups are
both long and short in firms with almost identical HHIs.19 By construction, any direct eﬀect
of the HHI on abnormal returns should thus “cancel out”. Not surprisingly, when we compute
abnormal returns using a five-factor model that includes the HHI as a risk factor, we find that
our results remain virtually unchanged (see below). Alternatively, “industry eﬀects” could also
come from a clustering of Democracy and Dictatorship firms in industries with high and low
abnormal returns, respectively, where the industry return is unrelated to the HHI. In this case,
however, it is not clear why the eﬀect would be monotonic in the HHI and insignificant in the
lowest HHI tercile. We will address this issue below using industry-adjusted abnormal returns.
Robustness
Table III contains various robustness checks. In each row of the table, we first report the
abnormal return to the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolio based on the entire sample,
followed by the abnormal returns to the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolios based on
individual HHI groups. We report the results both for value-weighted and equally-weighted
portfolios. For ease of comparison, we restate our main results from Table II in row [1].
In rows [2] to [4], we consider alternative measures of product market competition. In row
[2], we use the four-firm concentration ratio based on the 48 FF industries. As is shown, the
results are similar to those in row [1]. Since the competition measures in rows [1] and [2] are
computed from Compustat, they only include publicly traded companies. In row [3], we use
instead the HHI provided by the Census Bureau, which includes all public and private firms
in the U.S. Unfortunately, this measure is only available for manufacturing industries, which
19Table I sorts firms into HHI quintiles. However, we obtain similar results if we sort firms into HHI terciles.
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means we lose about half of our sample. By construction, smaller portfolios are more volatile.
Hence, we would expect the statistical significance of our results to become weaker, especially
in the (smaller) hedge portfolios based on individual HHI groups. For value-weighted portfolios,
we find that the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolio based on the entire sample earns a
monthly alpha of 0.93% (t = 2.42). When we form Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolios
based on individual HHI groups, we obtain the same picture as before. The alpha is small
(0.02%) and insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile, it is larger (0.69%) and (still) insignificant in
the medium HHI tercile, and it is largest (1.50%) and significant (t = 2.46) in the highest HHI
tercile. The results are similar for equally-weighted portfolios. In row [4], we use the four-firm
concentration ratio provided by the Census Bureau, which again includes all public and private
firms in the U.S., albeit only in manufacturing industries. As is shown, the results are similar
to those in row [3].
In rows [5] and [6], we consider alternative measures of corporate governance. In row [5],
we use the E-index by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). The authors argue that the six
provisions included in the E-index are the key drivers behind GIM’s results. Accordingly, the
E-index might be a less noisy proxy of corporate governance. If this is so, we would expect the
statistical significance of our results to become stronger. For value-weighted portfolios, we find
that the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolio based on the entire sample earns a monthly
alpha of 0.74% (t = 4.09). When we form Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolios based on
individual HHI groups, the picture is again similar to before. The alpha is small (0.02%) and
insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile, it is larger (0.84%) and significant (t = 2.92) in the
medium HHI tercile, and it is largest (1.53%) and significant (t = 3.42) in the highest HHI
tercile. The results are similar for equally-weighted portfolios. In row [6], we use the ATI by
Cremers and Nair (2005). While the G- and E-indices are often interpreted as measures of
takeover protection, the ATI truly warrants this interpretation. Besides the fact that the alphas
are smaller, the picture is again similar to before.
In rows [7] and [8], we revisit Cremers and Nair’s (2005) finding that the Democracy-
Dictatorship hedge portfolio earns a significant alpha only when institutional ownership is high.
Using the same proxy for institutional ownership as they do, namely, the percentage of shares
held by the 18 largest public pension funds (PP), we first divide both the Democracy and Dic-
tatorship portfolio each into equal-sized portfolios based on whether PP lies above or below the
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median.20 We subsequently divide each of the resulting portfolios into equal-sized portfolios
based on HHI terciles. This leaves us with 2× 2× 3 = 12 portfolios: one Democracy portfolio
and one Dictatorship portfolio for each PP-HHI group. For each such group, we then construct
a hedge portfolio that is long in the respective Democracy portfolio and short in the respective
Dictatorship portfolio. Doubling the number of hedge portfolios reduces the number of firms
in each portfolio, making the portfolios more volatile. Accordingly, we would expect the sta-
tistical significance of our results to become weaker. We obtain four main results. First, the
Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolio based on the entire sample earns a significant alpha
only when institutional ownership is high (0.77%, t = 3.02). Second, both in the entire sample
and in each HHI tercile individually, the alpha is always larger when institutional ownership is
high. Both findings are consistent with Cremers and Nair’s results. Third, for a given level of
institutional ownership, the alpha is monotonically increasing in the HHI, which is consistent
with our previous findings. Fourth, and also consistent with our previous findings, when insti-
tutional ownership is high, the alpha is only significant in the medium (0.86%, t = 2.06) and
highest (1.60%, t = 3.36) HHI terciles. Likewise, when institutional ownership is low, the alpha
is only significant in the highest HHI tercile (0.93%, t = 1.70). The results for equally-weighted
portfolios are qualitatively similar, except that the diﬀerences between high and low institu-
tional ownership are less pronounced.21 Overall, this suggests that our findings and Cremers
and Nair’s results are not mutually exclusive, but rather that they co-exist in the data.
In row [9], we exclude “new economy” firms as classified by Hand (2003). Core, Guay,
and Rusticus (2006) argue that GIM’s results are partly driven by these firms. When excluding
these firms, the authors find that the alpha of the value-weighted Democracy-Dictatorship hedge
portfolio drops to 0.46% (t = 1.83). In our sample, the (average) alpha drops to 0.43% (t =
1.71). However, when we form Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolios based on individual
20The list of the 18 largest pension funds is provided in the Appendix of Cremers and Nair (2005). The data
source is CDA Spectrum. Holdings are reported in March, June, September, and December of each year. To
incorporate holdings information into our trading strategies, we rebalance all portfolios in April, July, October,
and January using the holdings of the previous quarter. Cremers and Nair also use another proxy for institutional
ownership, namely, the percentage of shares held in each firm by the firm’s largest institutional blockholder. We
obtain similar results when using this alternative proxy.
21This is consistent with Panel (B) of Table III in Cremers and Nair (2005), where the alphas for equally-
weighted portfolios in the lowest and highest PP groups are almost identical, albeit, like here, their statistical
significance is higher when institutional ownership is high.
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HHI groups, the picture is again similar to before. The alpha is small (0.27%) and insignificant
in the lowest HHI tercile, it is larger (0.41%) and (still) insignificant in the medium HHI tercile,
and it is largest (0.82%) and significant (t = 2.04) in the highest HHI tercile.22 The results are
similar for equally-weighted portfolios.
In row [10], we extend the sample period until December 2006.23 For value-weighted port-
folios, Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) find that when the original sample period in GIM is
extended until December 2004, the alpha drops to 0.40% (t = 1.68).24 Similarly, if we extend
the sample period until December 2006, the alpha drops to 0.24% (t = 1.22) for value-weighted
portfolios and to 0.29% (t = 1.77) for equally-weighted portfolios. Note that these findings are
not inconsistent with the idea that corporate governance matters for equity returns. After all, it
could be that the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolio keeps performing well in the highest
HHI tercile, while higher noise in the other two terciles drives the average performance towards
a small (and sometimes insignificant) alpha. Indeed, when we consider Democracy-Dictatorship
hedge portfolios based on individual HHI groups, this is precisely what we find. For value-
weighted portfolios, the alpha is small (0.06%) and insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile, it is
larger (0.09%) and (still) insignificant in the medium HHI tercile, and it is largest (0.99%) and
significant (t = 2.55) in the highest HHI tercile. The results for equally-weighted portfolios are
similar.
In row [11], we focus on the post-GIM period after 1999. For value-weighted portfolios, Core,
Guay, and Rusticus (2006) find a negative (−0.13%) and insignificant alpha for the sub-period
from January 2000 to December 2004. Similarly, when we focus on the sub-period from January
2000 to December 2006, we obtain a negative alpha of −0.21% for value-weighted portfolios and a
positive alpha of 0.20% for equally-weighted portfolios. Both alphas are insignificant. However,
when we form Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolios based on individual HHI groups, we
22As an alternative to excluding the Internet firms identified by Hand (2003), Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006)
exclude all firms in 2-digit SIC industries that are related to the “new economy” (SIC codes 35, 36, 38, and 73).
We obtain similar results when using this alternative method.
23We rebalance all portfolios in November 1999, January 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are
the months after which new IRRC data became available. We additionally rebalance all portfolios each July to
incorporate new values of the HHI.
24Similarly, Cremers and Nair (2005) find that the annual alpha drops to 7.5% (from 8.5%) if the original
sample period in GIM is extended until December 2001.
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obtain the same picture as before. The alpha is again monotonically increasing in the HHI both
for value- and equally-weighted portfolios, albeit in the highest HHI tercile it is only significant
for equally-weighted portfolios (0.88%, t = 2.24). The latter result deserves closer investigation.
It could be that the insignificant alpha for value-weighted portfolios is due to a few bad years for
larger firms. Alternatively, it could be that the significant alpha for equally-weighted portfolios is
due to a few lucky years for smaller firms. To investigate this issue, we split the post-GIM period
into two sub-periods of equal length (January 2000 to June 2003 and July 2003 to December
2006).25 Our results (not reported) show that the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolio keeps
performing well after 1999. For value-weighted portfolios, the alpha in the highest HHI tercile is
insignificant only in the first sub-period, while it is large and significant (1.44%, t = 2.44) in the
second sub-period. For equally-weighted portfolios, the alpha in the highest HHI tercile is large
and significant both in the first (1.12%, t = 1.67) and second (0.93%, t = 2.03) sub-period. The
alphas in the other HHI terciles are insignificant, both for value- and equally-weighted portfolios.
Industry Eﬀects
It could be that our results are not driven by corporate governance, but rather that they
reflect a direct eﬀect of competition on stock returns. Precisely, the worry is that Democracy
and Dictatorship firms cluster along industries with diﬀerent HHIs. For instance, if firms in the
highest HHI tercile of the Democracy portfolio had on average lower HHIs than firms in the
highest HHI tercile of the Dictatorship portfolio, and if competition had a positive direct eﬀect
on stock returns, then this could potentially explain our results. We have already argued why
this is rather unlikely. As is shown in Panel (A) of Table I, the empirical distribution of the HHI
among Democracy and Dictatorship firms is virtually identical. Accordingly, the Democracy-
Dictatorship hedge portfolio in the highest (or any other) HHI tercile is both long and short in
firms with almost identical HHIs, implying that, by construction, any direct eﬀect of the HHI
on abnormal returns should “cancel out”.
Table IV addresses this issue in a more rigorous fashion. In a recent paper, Hou and
Robinson (2006) document that product market competition, as measured by the HHI, has a
direct eﬀect on stock returns even after controlling for the usual four risk factors. To capture
this eﬀect, the authors construct an additional risk factor, the “concentration premium” λH , by
25Splitting the post-GIM period into more than two sub-periods is problematic. Already with two sub-periods,
the sample length per sub-period is only 48 months, making statistical inferences diﬃcult.
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running monthly cross-sectional regressions of individual stock returns on a constant, the HHI,
size (in logs), book-to-market (in logs), leverage, the post-ranking beta as defined in Fama and
French (1992), and the past one-year stock return (momentum). The concentration premium in
month t is the estimated coeﬃcient on the HHI.26
To examine if our results are driven by a direct eﬀect of competition on stock returns, we
augment equation (1) by including the Hou-Robinson concentration premium as an additional
risk factor. That is, we estimate the five-factor model
Rt = α+ β1 ×RMRFt + β2 × SMBt + β3 ×HMLt + β4 × UMDt + β5 × λHt + εt, (2)
where Rt, RMRFt, SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt are defined as above, and where λHt is the
Hou-Robinson concentration premium. If our results are driven by a direct eﬀect of competition
on stock returns, then we would expect the alpha to become insignificant when competition is
added as a risk factor. The results are shown in row [2]. For ease of comparison, we restate our
main results from Table II in row [1]. As can be seen, the alphas in rows [1] and [2] are identical,
both for value- and equally weighted portfolios. Moreover, the concentration premium itself is
not significant (not reported). This result is not inconsistent with Hou and Robinson’s finding
that competition has a direct eﬀect on stock returns. Rather, as explained above, it reflects the
fact that the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolio already fully accounts for this direct eﬀect
by construction.
Competition is not the only possible source of abnormal industry returns. It could be that
Democracy and Dictatorship firms cluster along industries with high and low abnormal returns,
respectively, where the abnormal return is driven by industry attributes other than the HHI. In
this case, however, it is not clear why the alpha would be monotonic in the HHI and insignificant
in the lowest HHI tercile. To address this issue, we re-estimate equation (1) using industry-
adjusted returns. In each month, we compute the median industry return in a given FF industry
using all firms in the merged Compustat/CRSP database and subtract it from the individual
stock return. The results are presented in row [3]. The alpha is again small (0.38%) and
insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile, it is larger (0.49%) and (still) insignificant in the medium
HHI tercile, and it is largest (1.15%) and significant (t = 2.72) in the highest HHI tercile. The
results for equally-weighted portfolios are similar. In row [4], we use again industry-adjusted
26Hou and Robinson (2006) compute the HHI based on 3-digit SIC industries. We use the 48 FF industries
for internal consistency. However, we obtain similar results when using 3-digit SIC industries.
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returns, though now in conjunction with the five-factor model in equation (2), which includes
competition as an additional risk factor. The alphas are virtually identical to those in row [3],
both for value- and equally weighted portfolios. This is not surprising. Since the Democracy-
Dictatorship hedge portfolio already fully controls for any direct eﬀect of competition, it should
make little diﬀerence if we use the model in equation (1) or equation (2).
3.2 Fama-MacBeth Return Regressions
It is possible that the abnormal returns to the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolio are
driven by an omitted variable bias. Such a bias could arise if the G-index is correlated with
firm characteristics that were priced during the sample period but that are not captured by
the model in equation (1). To address this concern, GIM estimate Fama-MacBeth regressions
that include a broad array of control variables. We augment GIM’s specification in two ways.
First, to examine whether governance has a diﬀerent eﬀect on stock returns in competitive and
non-competitive industries, we interact it with the HHI. Second, we include additional controls.
For each month, we estimate the cross-sectional regression
rit = αt + β
0
t(Git × Iit) + γ0tXit + εit, (3)
where rit is the return on firm i’s stock in month t, Git is either the G-index or a Democracy
dummy, Iit is a (3 × 1) vector of HHI dummies, and Xit is a vector of control variables. All
right-hand side variables are lagged. The HHI dummies indicate whether the HHI of firm i in
month t lies in the lowest, medium, or highest tercile of its empirical distribution. We estimate
equation (3) for each month and calculate the mean and time-series standard deviation of the
112 monthly estimates to obtain the Fama-MacBeth coeﬃcients and standard errors.
As elements of X, we include the full set of controls used in GIM: firm size, book-to-market
ratio, stock price, return from months t−3 to t−2, from months t−6 to t−4, and from months
t− 12 to t− 7, respectively, (dollar) trading volume of NYSE or AMEX stocks, (dollar) trading
volume of NASDAQ stocks, a NASDAQ dummy, an S&P 500 dummy, dividend yield, sales
growth over the previous five fiscal years, and institutional ownership. A detailed description of
all of these variables is provided in GIM. To control for any direct eﬀect of competition on stock
returns (see previous section), we also include HHI dummies. Finally, we include a proxy for
idiosyncratic volatility. In a recent paper, Ferreira and Laux (2007) show that firms with fewer
antitakeover provisions display higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility. This could have pricing
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implications. We proxy for idiosyncratic volatility using the Ferreira-Laux measure
Ψit = ln
µ
1−R2it
R2it
¶
,
where R2it is the R-squared from the monthly regression ridt = αit + βit × rmdt + εidt, in which
ridt and rmdt are the excess return on stock i and the value-weighted CRSP market index,
respectively, on day d in month t. In the cross-sectional regression in month t, we include as a
control variable the idiosyncratic volatility in month t− 1.
The results are presented in Table V. In columns [1] and [2], we proxy for governance
using the G-index. In columns [3] and [4], we use the Democracy dummy as our governance
proxy while restricting the sample to Democracy and Dictatorship firms. In columns [1] and
[3], governance is not interacted with competition. Thus, except for the inclusion of the HHI
and idiosyncratic volatility as additional controls, these regressions mirror those in GIM. The
regressions in columns [2] and [4] are those depicted in equation (3). For brevity’s sake, we only
report the coeﬃcients on G and G× I, which are our main variables of interest.
In column [1], the coeﬃcient on the (non-interacted) G-index is small (−0.04) and insignif-
icant, although it has the right sign. As GIM note, the coeﬃcient on the G-index can be
interpreted as a monthly abnormal return. Thus, on average, the monthly abnormal return
associated with the G-index is a mere 0.04%, which is identical to the number in GIM. In col-
umn [2], the G-index is interacted with the HHI. As is shown, the coeﬃcient on the G-index is
monotonic in the HHI, but it is again small in magnitude. Even in the highest HHI tercile, the
coeﬃcient on the G-index is only −0.12 (t = 1.93), which corresponds to a monthly abnormal
return of only 0.12%. The results are markedly diﬀerent if we proxy for governance using the
Democracy dummy. In column [3], the coeﬃcient on the (non-interacted) Democracy dummy
is 0.77 (t = 2.43), which is close to the number in GIM (0.76, t = 2.38). In column [4], the
Democracy dummy is interacted with the HHI. As is shown, the coeﬃcient on the Democracy
dummy is small (0.24) and insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile, it is larger (1.00) and mar-
ginally significant (t = 1.72) in the medium HHI tercile, and it is largest (1.77) and significant
(t = 2.52) in the highest HHI tercile.
That all results are stronger if we use the Democracy dummy does not surprise. As is typically
the case with equity returns, the eﬀect can only be found in the extremes. Accordingly, and
consistent with the idea behind the construction of the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolio,
if one wants to find an eﬀect of governance on stock returns, one must consider extreme values
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of governance, like those associated with Democracy and Dictatorship firms.
3.3 Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts
There are two potential explanations for the abnormal returns earned by the Democracy-
Dictatorship hedge portfolio. One is an omitted variable bias. Such a bias could arise if
governance provisions are correlated with firm or other characteristics that were priced dur-
ing the sample period but that are not captured by the asset pricing model used to calculate
abnormal returns. In the previous section, and consistent with GIM’s own findings, we found
no evidence for this hypothesis. The alternative explanation is that weak governance gives rise
to agency costs whose magnitude was underestimated by investors. Consistent with the first
part of this hypothesis, GIM find that weak governance is associated with both higher capital
expenditures and higher acquisition activity. Likewise, Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) and
GIM both find that weak governance is associated with lower operating performance. However,
Core, Guay, and Rusticus find no evidence for the second part of the hypothesis, namely, that
investors were surprised. The authors test whether the stock market underperformance of weak
governance firms is due to investor surprise about the poor operating performance of these firms.
Using analysts’ earnings forecasts to proxy for investors’ expectations, they find no significant
relation between forecast errors and governance proxies.
Given our previous results, a natural question is whether analysts correctly predict that
governance has a diﬀerent eﬀect in competitive and non-competitive industries. Following Core,
Guay, and Rusticus, we use analysts’ earnings forecasts to proxy for investors’ expectations.
The data on analysts’ forecasts are obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System
(I/B/E/S). Our main measure is the mean I/B/E/S consensus forecast of annual earnings per
share (EPS), measured 8 months prior to the fiscal year’s end. We will use median I/B/E/S
consensus forecasts in robustness checks. Measuring analysts’ forecasts 8 months (instead of 12
months) before the fiscal year’s end ensures that the analysts know the previous year’s earnings
when making their forecasts. Analysts’ forecasts are scaled by lagged total assets per share,
where total assets is the book value of total assets (Compustat item #6) in the previous fiscal
year, and where the number of shares in the month of the forecast is taken from CRSP.27 To
27Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) also use the mean I/B/E/S consensus forecast of annual EPS measured 8
months prior to the fiscal year’s end and scale it by either lagged total assets per share or by the lagged share
price. We obtain similar results when using the latter scaling method.
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mitigate the eﬀect of outliers and coding errors, we remove observations for which the forecast
error is larger than 10% of the share price in the month of the forecast (less than 3% of the
sample).28 Moreover, to ensure that the consensus forecasts are reliable proxies of market
expectations, we require that a company is followed by at least five analysts.29
We estimate the equation
yit = αj + αt + β0 (Git−1 × Iit−1) + γ0Xit−1 + εit, (4)
where yit is either the mean (median) I/B/E/S consensus forecast of annual EPS, the actual
I/B/E/S annual EPS, or the forecast error (actual I/B/E/S annual EPS minus mean (median)
I/B/E/S consensus forecast of annual EPS), all scaled down by lagged total assets per share,
for firm i in year t, αj and αt are industry- and year-fixed eﬀects, Git−1 is a 1-year lagged
Democracy dummy, Iit−1 is a (3 × 1) vector of 1-year lagged HHI dummies, and Xit−1 is a
vector of control variables. As controls, we include 1-year lagged HHI dummies, 1-year lagged
book-to-market ratio, and 1-year lagged firm size. To allow the book-to-market ratio and firm
size to have diﬀerent eﬀects across HHI terciles, we interact each of these variables with 1-year
lagged HHI dummies. Firm size is the logarithm of the book value of total assets (Compustat
item #6). The book-to-market ratio is computed as the logarithm of the ratio of the market
value of equity (item #199 × item #25) over the book value of equity (item #60 + item #74).
The sample is restricted to Democracy and Dictatorship firms and ranges from 1991 to 1999.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.30
The results are presented in Table VI. Panel (A) considers mean I/B/E/S consensus fore-
casts, while Panel (B) considers median I/B/E/S consensus forecasts. For brevity’s sake, we only
discuss Panel (A). The results in Panel (B) are virtually identical. As in the previous section,
we show first the results for the non-interacted Democracy dummy (columns [1] to [3]), followed
by the results for when the Democracy dummy is interacted with HHI dummies (columns [4]
28See, e.g., Easterwood and Nutt (1999), Lim (2001), and Teoh and Wong (2002).
29See, e.g., Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999), Easterwood and Nutt (1999), and Loha and Mianc (2006).
30Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) use the Fama-MacBeth method while accounting for serial correlation using
the Newey-West procedure with one lag. Given that both the dependent and independent variables are persistent,
the Fama-MacBeth method produces biased standard errors even if combined with the Newey-West procedure
(Petersen (2007)). To address this bias, we estimate a panel with fixed eﬀects and clustered standard errors. The
choice of industry- rather than firm-fixed eﬀects is due to insuﬃcient within-variation of the G-index (see Section
4 below and p. 126 in GIM).
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to [6]). For brevity’s sake, we only report the coeﬃcients on G and G× I, which are our main
variables of interest. All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100.
Columns [1] and [2] show that Democracy firms exhibit on average higher EPS than Dic-
tatorship firms, and that analysts correctly predict this outcome. The forecast error, which
is reported in column [3], is small and insignificant. Based on this result, Core, Guay, and
Rusticus conclude that investors were not surprised. Columns [4] to [6] paint a more nuanced
picture. Column [4] shows that Democracy firms exhibit significantly higher EPS only when
competition is weak. While the diﬀerence in (actual) EPS between Democracy and Dictatorship
firms is small and insignificant in the lowest and medium HHI terciles, it is large and significant
in the highest HHI tercile. Second, and this is remarkable, analysts seem to understand that
governance has an eﬀect on EPS only in non-competitive industries. As column [5] shows, the
diﬀerence in forecasted EPS between Democracy and Dictatorship firms is small and insignifi-
cant in the lowest and medium HHI terciles, while it is large and significant in the highest HHI
tercile. However, analysts seem to underestimate the magnitude of the eﬀect of governance in
non-competitive industries. While the forecast error in column [6] is small and insignificant in
the lowest and medium HHI terciles, it is positive and significant in the highest HHI tercile.
Thus, analysts underestimate the eﬀect of governance on EPS in precisely those industries in
which governance matters for EPS. Whether the forecast error is large enough to fully explain
the abnormal returns in GIM is an open question. At a minimum, it provides evidence in
support of the hypothesis that investors were surprised, which is consistent with GIM’s own
interpretation of their findings.
4 Firm Value and Operating Performance
To provide further evidence on the role of governance, GIM examine the relation between gov-
ernance and firm value (Tobin’s Q) and between governance and operating performance (net
profit margin, return on equity, sales growth). Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) extend GIM’s
results by examining the relation between governance and return on assets. In this section, we
investigate whether the relation between governance and either firm value or operating perfor-
mance is diﬀerent in competitive and non-competitive industries. We first consider Tobin’s Q.
In the next section, we consider return on assets, net profit margin, and return on equity.31
31The results for sales growth are similar to those of the other performance measures.
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4.1 Corporate Governance and Firm Value
Main Results
Tobin’s Q is computed using the same definition as in GIM. Tobin’s Q is the market value
of assets divided by the book value of assets (Compustat item #6), where the market value of
assets is the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock (item #24 × item
#25) minus the sum of the book value of common stock (item #60) and balance sheet deferred
taxes (item #74). Following GIM, we compute industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q by subtracting the
industry median in a given FF industry and year. Industry medians are computed using all
firms in the Compustat universe. The sample period is from 1990 to 2006.32
As in GIM, we first estimate Fama-MacBeth regressions of industry-adjusted Q on the G-
index (or the G-index interacted with HHI dummies) and controls. This method has been
criticized for producing biased standard errors when both the dependent and independent vari-
ables are persistent (Petersen, 2007). To address this bias, we will re-estimate our results using
a panel with fixed eﬀects and clustered standard errors.
For each year, we estimate the cross-sectional regression
Q∗it = αt + β
0
t (Git × Iit) + γ0tXit + εit, (5)
where Q∗it is the industry-adjusted Q of firm i in year t, Git is the G-index, Iit is a (3×1) vector of
HHI dummies, and Xit is a vector of control variables.33 We estimate equation (5) for each year
separately and calculate the mean and time-series standard deviation of the yearly estimates to
obtain the Fama-MacBeth coeﬃcients and standard errors. As elements of X, we include the
full set of controls used in GIM: firm size, which is the logarithm of the book value of total
assets (Compustat item #6), firm age (in logs), an S&P 500 dummy, and a Delaware dummy.
To control for any direct eﬀect of competition, we also include HHI dummies. Moreover, to
32 In Section 3, where we considered stock returns, we used the original sample period in GIM (1990 to 1999)
to make our results comparable to theirs. In the case of Tobin’s Q, GIM estimate cross-sectional regressions for
each year separately. Thus, we can extend the sample period while still comparing our results to GIM’s original
results for the years 1990 to 1999.
33When we examined the performance of governance-based trading strategies, we restricted the sample to
Democracy and Dictatorship firms. This is because, as is typically the case with equity returns, the eﬀect could
only be found in the extremes. In the case of Tobin’s Q, such a restriction is not necessary, which means we can
use the full sample and the G-index as our governance proxy.
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allow the control variables to have diﬀerent eﬀects across HHI terciles, we interact each of them
with HHI dummies. For brevity’s sake, we only report the coeﬃcients on G and G × I, which
are our main variables of interest.
The results are presented in Table VII. Each row refers to a diﬀerent year. The Fama-
MacBeth coeﬃcients are reported in the last row. As previously, we estimate equation (5) first
without and then with HHI dummies. Column [1] shows the coeﬃcient on G in the regression
without HHI dummies. This regression is identical to the specification in GIM. Columns [2] to
[4] show the coeﬃcients on G× I in the regressions with HHI dummies.
As is shown in column [1], the coeﬃcient on the (non-interacted) G-index is always negative
and almost always significant (14 out of 17 years). The estimates for the years 1990 to 1999
mirror the findings in GIM.34 The estimates for the years after 1999 are similar. Thus, unlike the
abnormal returns to the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolio, the negative relation between
firm value and the G-index does not weaken after 1999. In the last row, the Fama-MacBeth
coeﬃcient for the years 1990 to 2006 is −0.040 (t = 6.10), which is similar to what GIM have
found for the years 1990 to 1999 (−0.043, t = 4.78).
As columns [2] to [4] show, the basic pattern across HHI terciles is similar to what we have
found in the case of equity returns. The coeﬃcient on the G-index is monotonic in the HHI in
the majority of years (13 out of 17 years), it is always small and insignificant in the lowest HHI
tercile, and it is always negative, economically large, and almost always significant (16 out of
17 years) in the highest HHI tercile. In some years, it is also significant in the medium HHI
tercile. The Fama-MacBeth coeﬃcients in the last row reflect this pattern. The Fama-MacBeth
coeﬃcient is small (−0.004) and insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile, it is larger (−0.047)
and significant (t = 4.66) in the medium HHI tercile, and it is largest (−0.073) and significant
(t = 7.36) in the highest HHI tercile.
As in the context of equity returns, our results can be interpreted in two ways. One inter-
pretation is that governance has no eﬀect on firm value in competitive industries. The other
interpretation, which is merely the other side of the coin, is that governance has a strong eﬀect
on firm value in non-competitive industries. In those industries, the eﬀect of governance is al-
most twice as large as what has been reported in GIM, who show the average eﬀect across all
34The coeﬃcients are close but not identical to those in GIM due to small diﬀerences in industry adjustments.
While GIM assign firms to FF industries using the SIC codes from CRSP, we use the SIC codes from Compustat
for internal consistency, since our HHI measure is computed using sales from Compustat.
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industries.
As we have already remarked above, the statistical significance of the Fama-MacBeth coeﬃ-
cients must be interpreted with caution. In a simulation-based study, Petersen (2007) shows that
the Fama-MacBeth standard errors will be biased downwards if both the left- and right-hand
side variables are persistent. In Table VII, the t−statistics associated with the Fama-MacBeth
coeﬃcients are arguably very large, especially since they are only based on 17 annual coeﬃcients.
For instance, the t−statistic in the lowest HHI tercile is 1.01 even though the coeﬃcient itself is
close to zero. Note also that the coeﬃcients in the lowest HHI tercile are all negative until the
year 2000, after which they become all positive (except for the year 2004, where the coeﬃcient is
virtually zero). This is suspicious given that the coeﬃcients in the lowest HHI tercile are small
and not statistically diﬀerent from zero, in which case, had they been random draws, their signs
should be erratic and not follow any specific pattern.
As an alternative to using the Fama-MacBeth method, Petersen (2007) advocates the use of
a pooled panel with clustered standard errors. We will adopt this approach both in this and the
following section, where we estimate performance regressions plagued by similar (persistence)
problems. Throughout, we cluster standard errors at the industry level.35 Moreover, we include
both industry- and year-fixed eﬀects. The use of industry- rather than firm-fixed eﬀects is due
to insuﬃcient within-variation of the G-index, a point that has already been made by GIM (p.
126). In robustness checks, we will use firm- instead of industry-fixed eﬀects, mindful of the
limitation that the identification of the main coeﬃcients comes from relatively rare changes of
the G-index.
We estimate the equation
Q∗it = αj + αt + β
0 (Git × Iit) + γ0Xit + εit, (6)
where Q∗it, Git, Iit, and Xit are defined as above, and where αj and αt are industry- and year-
fixed eﬀects, respectively.
The results are presented in Table VIII. The estimate in column [1] is the counterpart
of the Fama-MacBeth estimate in column [1] of Table VII. Likewise, the estimates in column
35Clustering standard errors at the industry level accounts for arbitrary correlations of the error terms i) across
diﬀerent firms in a given industry and year (cross-sectional correlation), ii) across diﬀerent firms in a given industry
over time (across-firm serial correlation), and iii) within the same firm over time (within-firm serial correlation).
Clustering by industry is thus more general than, e.g., clustering by either firm or industry-year.
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[2] are the counterparts of the Fama-MacBeth estimates in column [2] to [4] of Table VII. As
can be seen, the coeﬃcients in both tables are very similar. In column [1], the coeﬃcient
on the (non-interacted) G-index is −0.036 (t = 3.46), while the corresponding Fama-MacBeth
coeﬃcient is −0.040 (t = 6.10). Likewise, in columns [2] to [4], the coeﬃcient on the G-index
in the lowest, medium, and highest HHI tercile is −0.003 (t = 0.32), −0.044 (t = 2.03), and
−0.067 (t = 3.37), respectively, while the corresponding Fama-MacBeth coeﬃcients are −0.004
(t = 1.01), −0.047 (t = 4.66), and −0.073 (t = 7.36), respectively. As one would expect, the
t−statistics are all considerably smaller when using clustered standard errors. Nevertheless, the
economic interpretation of the results remains the same. While governance has no eﬀect on firm
value in competitive industries, it has a strong eﬀect in non-competitive industries. Moreover,
since the coeﬃcient on the G-index in the highest HHI tercile is very similar to the corresponding
Fama-MacBeth estimate, it also remains true that the eﬀect of governance on firm value in non-
competitive industries is almost twice as large as what has been previously reported by GIM,
who document the average eﬀect across all industries.
Robustness
Table IX contains various robustness checks. In each row of the table, we first report the
coeﬃcient on G in the regression without HHI dummies, followed by the coeﬃcients on G × I
in the regressions with HHI dummies. For ease of comparison, we restate our main results from
Table VIII in row [1].
The robustness checks in rows [2] to [7] are analogous to those in Table III, which is why we
refer to Section 3.1 for a description of the variables and motivation of the various robustness
checks. As is shown, the basic pattern is similar in all rows. The coeﬃcient on the G-index
is always monotonic in the HHI, it is always small and insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile,
and it is always large and significant in the medium and highest HHI terciles. Interestingly, and
in contrast to Table III where we computed abnormal returns to the Democracy-Dictatorship
hedge portfolio, the results do not weaken substantially if we exclude “new economy” firms as
classified by Hand (2003) (see row [7]).
In row [8], we use non-industry adjusted Tobin’s Q. As is shown, the results are virtually
unchanged. In row [9], we use firm-fixed eﬀects instead of industry-fixed eﬀects. As we have
already remarked, this specification must be interpreted with caution as the identification of the
main coeﬃcients comes from relatively rare changes of the G-index. With this qualification in
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mind, it is interesting to note that we obtain again similar results, albeit the coeﬃcients and
their statistical significance are weaker. In particular, the basic pattern across HHI terciles is
similar to before. The coeﬃcient on the G-index is small (0.003) and insignificant in the lowest
HHI tercile, it is larger (−0.018) and (still) insignificant in the medium HHI tercile, and it is
largest (−0.052) and significant (t = 2.91) in the highest HHI tercile.
In row [10], we use median (least absolute deviation) regressions instead of OLS regressions
to account for the presence of outliers.36 The main complication introduced by using median
regressions in the context of panel data is the computation of the standard errors. If there is
cross-sectional and serial dependence within an industry, the asymptotic covariance matrix of
Koenker and Bassett (1978), which assumes independent observations, cannot be used. The
standard bootstrap approach cannot be used either, because it only corrects for heteroscedas-
ticity. To circumvent this problem, we use a modified bootstrap approach: block bootstrapping.
The diﬀerence to a standard bootstrapping procedure is that instead of drawing single observa-
tions, we draw entire blocks of observations. The idea is to preserve the correlation structure
within each block and to use the independence between the blocks to consistently estimate the
standard errors. In analogy to the clustering approach that we used in the OLS regressions, we
form 48 blocks, that is, one block for each FF industry. Specifically, we construct a large number
(200) of bootstrap samples by drawing with replacement 48 industries from our sample. For
each bootstrap sample, we estimate our basic specification using the median regression and store
the coeﬃcients. For each coeﬃcient φ, we can then construct a confidence interval from the em-
pirical distribution of the sample of bootstrapped coeﬃcients {φk, k = 1, ..., 200} , which allows
us to compute the p−value for the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient is zero.37 The p−value is
computed as p = |1− 2n|, where n is the fraction of the 200 bootstrapped coeﬃcients that are
negative.
As is shown in row [10], both the coeﬃcients and their statistical significance are weaker if
we use median regressions instead of OLS, which suggests that our previous OLS estimates are
partly driven by outliers. Still, the picture is qualitatively similar to before. In the regression
without HHI dummies, the coeﬃcient on the (non-interacted) G-index is negative (−0.007) and
36GIM do not use median regressions in conjunction with Tobin’s Q, but they note that their results remain
unchanged if they trim the data to account for outliers (footnote 18, p. 126).
37This corresponds to the so-called “percentile method,” which is recommended by Koenker and Hallock (2000,
p. 14) in the context of the median regression.
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significant (p = 0.02). Likewise, in the regression with HHI dummies, the coeﬃcient on the
G-index is small (−0.001) and insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile, it is larger (−0.013) and
marginally significant (p = 0.07) in the medium HHI tercile, and it is largest (−0.022) and
significant (p = 0.00) in the highest HHI tercile.
While all coeﬃcients are weaker if we use the median regression, they remain economically
significant. For instance, a coeﬃcient of −0.022 in the highest HHI tercile means that adding one
(anti-)governance provision (an increase in the G-index by one index point) decreases Tobin’s
Q by 2.2 percentage points. Adding nine (anti-)governance provisions (e.g., switching from the
Democracy cutoﬀ (G-index of 5) to the Dictatorship cutoﬀ (G-index of 14)) decreases Tobin’s
Q by almost 20 percentage points. We have verified that all results in Table IX are similar if we
use median regressions instead of OLS.
4.2 Corporate Governance and Operating Performance
We consider three measures of operating performance: return on assets (ROA), net profit margin
(NPM), and return on equity (ROE). ROA is arguably the most suited of these measures. NPM
is based on firms’ sales, which can be very volatile, while ROE depends on firms’ leverage. ROA
is net income (Compustat item #172) divided by the book value of total assets (item #6), NPM
is net income divided by sales (item #12), and ROE is net income divided by the book value
of common stock (item #60). As in the case of Tobin’s Q, all of these measures are industry-
adjusted by subtracting the industry median in a given FF industry and year. Industry medians
are computed using all firms in the Compustat universe.
We use the same specification as in equation (6), except that the dependent variable is now
either ROA, NPM, or ROE. The sample period is again from 1990 to 2006. Following GIM, we
include as an additional control the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio in the previous fiscal
year. The book-to-market ratio is computed as the ratio of the book value of common stock
(item #60) plus balance sheet deferred taxes (item #74) over the market value of common stock
(item #24 × item #25). To account for outliers, which is a common occurrence for all three
performance measures, we follow GIM and use median (least absolute deviation) regressions in
place of OLS.38 As we did in row [10] of Table IX, we assess the statistical significance of the
38 In all our regressions, we obtain similar results when using OLS with the dependent variable being trimmed
at some reasonable cutoﬀ (e.g., 1% and 99%).
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coeﬃcients using block bootstrapping (48 blocks and 200 bootstrap samples). For brevity’s sake,
we only report the coeﬃcients on G and G× I.
The results are presented in Table X. Columns [1] and [2] show the results with ROA as the
dependent variable, columns [3] and [4] show the results with NPM as the dependent variable,
and columns [5] and [6] show the results with ROE as the dependent variable. As previously, we
estimate each regression first without and then with HHI dummies. The odd-numbered columns
show the coeﬃcient on G in the regressions without HHI dummies, while the even-numbered
columns show the coeﬃcients on G × I in the regressions with HHI dummies. All coeﬃcients
are multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience.
As column [1] shows, governance has on average a significant positive eﬀect on ROA. The
coeﬃcient on the (non-interacted) G-index is −0.071 (p = 0.00), which means that adding one
(anti-)governance provision (an increase in the G-index by one index point) decreases ROA by
0.071 percentage points. (Recall that all coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100.) This is similar in
magnitude to the estimates in Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006), who find that the marginal
eﬀect of an increase in the G-index on ROA is between −0.03 and −0.1 percentage points.39
In column [2], the pattern across HHI terciles is similar to what we have found in the case of
Tobin’s Q. The coeﬃcient on the G-index is again small (−0.006) and insignificant in the lowest
HHI tercile, it is larger (−0.109) and significant (p = 0.00) in the medium HHI tercile, and it is
largest (−0.140) and significant (p = 0.00) in the highest HHI tercile.
In column [3], the marginal eﬀect of an increase in the G-index on NPM is −0.078 (p = 0.00),
which is roughly similar to what GIM have found for the years 1990 to 1999 (−0.064, t = 4.92).40
In column [4], the basic pattern across HHI terciles is again similar to before. The coeﬃcient on
the G-index is small (−0.031) and insignificant in the lowest HHI tercile, it is larger (−0.094)
and marginally significant (p = 0.08) in the medium HHI tercile, and it is largest (−0.117) and
significant (p = 0.00) in the highest HHI tercile.
39The economic magnitude is also similar to that in Table VI of this paper, which shows that switching from the
Dictatorship to the Democracry portfolio increases EPS (scaled by assets per share) by 0.60 percentage points. In
Table X, given that a switch from the Dictatorship to the Democracry portfolio implies a decrease in the G-index
of approximately 10.22 index points, the associated increase in ROA is about 0.071 × 10.22 ≈ 0.73 percentage
points, which is of a similar order of magnitude.
40 In GIM, the coeﬃcient on the G-index in the NPM and ROE regressions is −0.64 and −0.26, respectively
(Table IX, last row). However, GIM multiply all coeﬃcients by 1,000, while we multiply all coeﬃcients by 100.
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In column [5], the marginal eﬀect of an increase in the G-index on ROE is −0.015, although
the eﬀect is not statistically significant (p = 0.56). Again, this is similar to what GIM have
found for the years 1990 to 1999 (−0.026, t = 0.79). While the eﬀect of governance on ROE is
not significant on average, it is interesting to note that the pattern across HHI terciles is similar
to before. In column [6], the coeﬃcient on the G-index is small (0.005) and insignificant in the
lowest HHI tercile, it is larger (−0.032) and (still) insignificant in the medium HHI tercile, and
it is largest (−0.085) and marginally significant (p = 0.08) in the highest HHI tercile.
Overall, the results presented in this section are consistent with those obtained in the context
of Tobin’s Q and equity returns. While governance appears to matter only little in competi-
tive industries, it has a significant positive eﬀect on operating performance in non-competitive
industries. And like in the case of Tobin’s Q and equity returns, the eﬀect of governance on
operating performance in non-competitive industries is substantially larger than what has been
previously documented in either Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) or GIM, who both show the
average eﬀect across all industries.
5 Conclusion
Economists have long argued that managerial incentive problems are first and foremost an issue
for firms in non-competitive industries. By implication, firms in competitive industries should
benefit relatively less from good governance, while firms in non-competitive industries–where
lack of competitive pressure fails to enforce discipline on managers–should benefit relatively
more. The evidence presented in this paper supports this hypothesis. Whether we look at
stock returns, firm value, or operating performance, we consistently find the same pattern. The
eﬀect of governance is always monotonic in the degree of competition, it is always small and
insignificant in competitive industries, and it is always large and significant in non-competitive
industries. By construction, since the results in GIM and subsequent work document the av-
erage eﬀect across all industries, this implies that the eﬀects of governance (in non-competitive
industries) reported in this paper are stronger than what has been previously documented. For
example, GIM find that a hedge portfolio that is long in firms with good governance and short
in firms with bad governance earns a monthly alpha of 0.67%. When we sub-divide the hedge
portfolio into three hedge portfolios based on whether competition is low, medium, or high, we
find that the hedge portfolio associated with the lowest degree of competition earns a monthly
30
alpha of 1.47%, which is approximately twice as large as the alpha reported in GIM.
In some cases, we find that governance has a strong and significant eﬀect in non-competitive
industries, while the average eﬀect across all industries is small and insignificant. For example,
previous research has shown that the alpha earned by GIM’s hedge portfolio all but disappears
if the sample period is extended beyond 1999. When we extend the sample period until 2006,
we do indeed find that the average alpha is small and insignificant. However, the alpha remains
large and significant in non-competitive industries. Likewise, it has been argued that investors
in the 1990s fully anticipated the eﬀects of governance, implying that the alpha earned by the
hedge portfolio is likely due to an omitted risk factor. Consistent with prior research, we find
that on average investors were not surprised. However, investors did underestimate the eﬀect
of governance in non-competitive industries, the very industries in which governance matters
in the first place. Whether this investor surprise is large enough to fully explain the abnormal
returns is an open question. At a minimum, it provides evidence consistent with the notion that
investors did not fully anticipate the eﬀects of governance.
Our findings have important implications. On a practical note, our results imply that re-
searchers who want to investigate the eﬀects of governance could benefit from interacting gov-
ernance with measures of competition. In fact, as shown above, researchers might find that
governance has a strong and significant eﬀect in non-competitive industries even if the aver-
age eﬀect across all industries is insignificant. Perhaps more important, our results imply that
policy eﬀorts to improve corporate governance could benefit from focusing on non-competitive
industries. Moreover, such eﬀorts could be broadened to also include policy measures aimed at
improving an industry’s competitiveness, such as deregulation and antitrust laws.
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Table I 
Empirical Relation between G-index and HHI 
 
This table reports summary statistics on the empirical relation between the G-index and the HHI. G-index is the Governance index of Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003), which is obtained from the IRRC database. Democracy firms are firms with a G-index of 5 or less, while Dictatorship firms are 
firms with a G-index of 14 or higher. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is computed as the sum of squared market shares of all firms in 
an industry. Industries are classified using the 48 industry classification scheme by Fama and French (1997, “FF”). Market shares are computed based 
on firms’ sales (Compustat item #12) using all firms in the Compustat universe. The sample period is from 1990 to 2006. 
 
Panel (A): Empirical Distribution of the HHI among Democracy and Dictatorship Firms
First HHI Second HHI Third HHI Fourth HHI Fifth HHI
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Democracy Firms (G ≤ 5)
    Mean HHI 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.15
    Median HHI 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.11
    Range of HHI Values [0.01, 0.03] [0.03, 0.04] [0.04, 0.06] [0.06, 0.08] [0.08, 0.58]
Dictatorship Firms (G ≥ 14)
    Mean HHI 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.16
    Median HHI 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.11
    Range of HHI Values [0.01, 0.03] [0.03, 0.05] [0.05, 0.06] [0.06, 0.08] [0.08, 0.58]
Panel (B): Empirical Distribution of the G-index across HHI Quintiles
First HHI Second HHI Third HHI Fourth HHI Fifth HHI
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Mean G-Index 9.22 9.00 9.33 9.25 9.19
Median G-Index 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
Range of G-Index Values [2, 17] [2, 17] [2, 19] [2, 18] [2, 17]
 
 
Table II 
Trading Strategies 
 
This table reports the results from time-series regressions of monthly excess returns to a hedge portfolio that is long in Democracy firms and short in 
Dictatorship firms on an intercept (α or “alpha”), the market factor (RMRF), the size factor (SMB), the book-to-market factor (HML), and the momen-
tum factor (UMD). In Panels (A) and (B) monthly portfolio returns are value-weighted, while in Panel (C) they are equally-weighted. In Panel (A) the 
hedge portfolios are based on all firms in the sample, while in Panels (B) and (C) they are constructed by dividing both the Democracy and Dictator-
ship subsamples each into either two or three equal-sized groups by sorting firms according to their HHI. Panel (A) reports both the alpha and factor 
loadings, while Panels (B) and (C) report only the alpha. Democracy and Dictatorship firms and the HHI are defined in Table I. The RMRF, SMB, and 
HML factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s webpage. The UMD factor is computed using the procedure described in Carhart (1997). The 
sample period is from September 1990 to December 1999. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Panel (A): Value-weighted Democracy-Dictatorship Hedge Portfolios
GIM (2003)
Replication
Final Sample
Panel (B): Value-weighted Democracy-Dictatorship Hedge Portfolios Sorted by HHI Groups
α
t -statistic
α
t -statistic
Panel (C): Equally-weighted Democracy-Dictatorship Hedge Portfolios Sorted by HHI Groups
α
t -statistic
α
t -statistic
-0.01
-0.01
(0.57) (2.44) (5.50) (0.14)
-0.04 -0.22** -0.55***
-0.04
(2.71)
(5.17) (0.05)
(0.50) (2.50) (5.21) (0.12)
-0.54*** -0.00
(0.48)
-0.22** -0.54***
α RMRF SMB HML
0.71***
(2.73)
0.69***
UMD
(1.47) (3.13)
HHI Group HHI Group
0.43 1.08***
0.66***
(2.57)
-0.04 -0.22**
(2.43)
Below-median Above-median
HHI Tercile HHI Tercile HHI Tercile
Lowest Medium Highest
(0.90) (1.70) (3.38)
0.30 0.64* 1.47***
HHI Group HHI Group
Below-median Above-median
0.28 0.67**
Lowest Medium Highest
(0.97) (2.22)
0.28 0.42
HHI Tercile HHI Tercile HHI Tercile
(0.85) (1.27) (2.38)
0.72**
 
 
 
Table III 
Trading Strategies: Robustness 
 
This table reports the alphas for modified versions of the regressions in Table II. In the column “All Firms” the Democracy-Dictatorship hedge portfolio is based on all firms in the sample, analogous to Panel (A) of Table II. In the 
columns “Lowest HHI Tercile”, “Medium HHI Tercile”, and “Highest HHI Tercile” the hedge portfolios are constructed by dividing both the Democracy and Dictatorship subsamples each into three equal-sized groups by sorting 
firms based to their HHI, analogous to Panels (B) and (C) of Table II. (In rows [2] and [4] firms are sorted based on their “four-firm concentration ratio”.) In row [1] competition is measured using the HHI computed from 
Compustat as described in Table I. In row [2] competition is measured using the “four-firm concentration ratio” (“Top 4”), which is computed as the sum of market shares of the four largest firms in a given FF industry. Market 
shares are computed from Compustat based on firms’ sales (item #12) using all firms in the Compustat universe. In rows [3] and [4] competition is measured using the HHI and four-firm concentration ratio, respectively, provided 
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The sample is restricted to manufacturing industries. Industries are classified using 4-digit SIC codes until 1997 and 4-digit NAICS codes thereafter. In row [5] governance is measured using the E-
index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). The corresponding hedge portfolio is long in firms with E = 0 and short in firms with E ≥ 4. In row [6] governance is measured using the ATI index of Cremers and Nair (2005). The 
corresponding hedge portfolio is long in firms with ATI = 0 and short in firms with ATI ≥ 2. In rows [7] and [8] the sample is restricted to firms with above- or below-median institutional ownership, respectively. Institutional 
ownership is the percentage of shares held by the 18 largest public pension funds as described in Cremers and Nair (2005). The data on institutional holdings are obtained from CDA Spectrum. In row [9] “new economy” firms as 
classified by Hand (2003) are excluded from the sample. In row [10] the sample period is from September 1990 to December 2006. In row [11] the sample period is from January 2000 to December 2006. In all other rows the 
sample period is from September 1990 to December 1999. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Value-weighted Democracy-Dictatorship Hedge Portfolios Equally-weighted Democracy-Dictatorship Hedge Portfolios
All Lowest Medium Highest All Lowest Medium Highest
Firms HHI Tercile HHI Tercile HHI Tercile Firms HHI Tercile HHI Tercile HHI Tercile
[1] HHI (Compustat, 48 FF) 0.66*** 0.30 0.64* 1.47*** 0.48** 0.28 0.42 0.72**
(2.57) (0.90) (1.70) (3.38) (2.19) (0.85) (1.27) (2.38)
[2] Top 4 (Compustat, 48 FF) 0.66*** 0.15 0.62* 1.35*** 0.48** 0.32 0.55 0.56**
(2.57) (0.44) (1.71) (3.19) (2.19) (0.97) (1.59) (2.08)
[3] HHI (Census, Manuf. Ind.) 0.93** 0.02 0.69 1.50** 0.51* 0.31 0.44 0.81*
(2.43) (0.03) (1.33) (2.46) (1.82) (0.75) (1.12) (1.74)
[4]Top 4 (Census, Manuf. Ind.) 0.91** 0.00 0.60 1.11* 0.51* 0.41 0.36 0.76*
(2.39) (0.00) (1.11) (1.93) (1.80) (0.94) (0.80) (1.67)
[5] E-Index 0.74*** 0.02 0.84*** 1.53*** 0.47*** 0.21 0.53** 0.68***
(4.09) (0.09) (2.92) (3.42) (3.01) (0.89) (2.10) (3.10)
[6] ATI 0.29* 0.06 0.21 0.64** 0.33** 0.13 0.42** 0.44**
(1.91) (0.25) (0.98) (2.13) (2.53) (0.63) (2.10) (2.19)
[7] High Inst. Ownership 0.77*** 0.28 0.86** 1.60*** 0.49* 0.02 0.57 0.81**
(3.02) (0.84) (2.06) (3.36) (1.84) (0.04) (1.41) (2.05)
[8] Low Inst. Ownership 0.35 0.11 0.17 0.93* 0.48 0.28 0.36 0.72
(0.94) (0.21) (0.31) (1.70) (1.61) (0.55) (0.86) (1.32)
[9] Excluding "New Economy" 0.43* 0.27 0.41 0.82** 0.43** 0.24 0.35 0.72**
(1.71) (0.79) (1.05) (2.04) (2.03) (0.71) (1.10) (2.35)
[10] 1990-2006 0.24 0.06 0.09 0.99** 0.29* 0.00 0.12 0.73***
(1.22) (0.21) (0.30) (2.55) (1.77) (0.00) (0.48) (3.12)
[11] 2000-2006 -0.21 -0.41 -0.19 0.26 0.20 -0.36 0.08 0.88**
(0.65) (0.87) (0.41) (0.40) (0.76) (0.91) (0.19) (2.24)
 
 
 
Table IV 
Trading Strategies: Industry Effects 
 
This table reports the alphas of modified versions of the regressions in Table III.  The regressions in rows [2] and [4] are based on a five-factor model that includes, besides the four factors described in Table II, the “Hou-Robinson 
concentration premium” as an additional factor. The computation of the concentration premium is described in Hou and Robinson (2006). The regressions in rows [3] and [4] use industry-adjusted portfolio returns, which are 
computed by subtracting from the individual stock returns the corresponding industry median. Median industry returns are computed for each FF industry using all firms in the merged CRSP/Compustat database. The sample period 
is from September 1990 to December 1999. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Value-weighted Democracy-Dictatorship Hedge Portfolios Equally-weighted Democracy-Dictatorship Hedge Portfolios
All Lowest Medium Highest All Lowest Medium Highest
Firms HHI Tercile HHI Tercile HHI Tercile Firms HHI Tercile HHI Tercile HHI Tercile
[1] 4-Factor Model without 0.66*** 0.30 0.64* 1.47*** 0.48** 0.28 0.42 0.72**
[1] Industry-adjusted Returns (2.57) (0.90) (1.70) (3.38) (2.19) (0.85) (1.27) (2.38)
[2] 5-Factor Model without 0.66*** 0.30 0.64* 1.47*** 0.48** 0.28 0.42 0.72**
[1] Industry-adjusted Returns (2.60) (0.91) (1.69) (3.45) (2.18) (0.85) (1.27) (2.39)
[3] 4-Factor Model with 0.60** 0.38 0.49 1.15*** 0.42** 0.31 0.28 0.67**
[1] Industry-adjusted Returns (2.10) (0.92) (1.38) (2.72) (2.13) (1.02) (0.95) (2.29)
[4] 5-Factor Model with 0.60** 0.39 0.49 1.15*** 0.42** 0.31 0.28 0.67**
[1] Industry-adjusted Returns (2.10) (0.93) (1.38) (2.76) (2.13) (1.01) (0.95) (2.29)
 
 
Table V 
Fama-MacBeth Return Regressions 
 
This table reports Fama-MacBeth estimates from monthly cross-sectional regressions of individual stock returns on an intercept, either the G-index or 
a Democracy dummy, and control variables. All right-hand side variables are lagged. In columns [2] and [4] the G-index and the Democracy dummy 
are interacted with HHI dummies indicating whether the HHI lies in the lowest (“Low”), middle (“Medium”), or highest (“High”) tercile of its em-
pirical distribution. The Democracy dummy equals one if a firm is a Democracy firm. The samples in columns [3] and [4] are restricted to Democracy 
and Dictatorship firms. The G-index, the HHI, and Democracy firms are defined in Table I. The control variables are firm size, book-to-market ratio, 
stock price, return from months t-3 to t-2, from months t-6 to t-4, and from months t-12 to t-7, respectively, trading volume of NYSE or AMEX 
stocks, trading volume of NASDAQ stocks, a NASDAQ dummy, an S&P 500 dummy, dividend yield, sales growth over the previous five fiscal 
years, institutional ownership, HHI dummies, and idiosyncratic volatility. A description of all control variables (except for the HHI and idiosyncratic 
volatility) is found in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Idiosyncratic volatility is the measure Ψit described in Ferreira and Laux (2007), lagged by 
one month. Columns [1] and [3] report the coefficients on the G-index and the Democracy dummy, respectively. Columns [2] and [4] report the 
coefficients on interaction terms between either the G-index or the Democracy dummy and HHI dummies. The coefficients on the intercept and 
control variables are not reported. The sample period is from September 1990 to December 1999. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
G-Index -0.04
(1.28)
G-Index x HHI (Low) -0.02
(0.21)
G-Index x HHI (Medium) -0.02
(0.59)
G-Index x HHI (High) -0.12*
(1.93)
Democracy 0.77**
(2.43)
Democracy x HHI (Low) 0.24
(0.60)
Democracy x HHI (Medium) 1.00*
(1.72)
Democracy x HHI (High) 1.77**
(2.52)
Number of Months 112 112 112 112
Number of Observations 122,595 122,595 21,299 21,299
 
Table VI 
Analysts’ Forecast Errors 
 
This table reports the results from panel regressions of either the mean (or median) I/B/E/S consensus forecast of annual earnings per share (EPS), the 
actual I/B/E/S annual EPS, or the forecast error (actual I/B/E/S annual EPS minus mean (or median) I/B/E/S consensus forecast of annual EPS), all 
scaled down by lagged assets per share, on an intercept, year- and industry-fixed effects, a Democracy dummy, and control variables. In columns [4] 
to [6] the Democracy dummy is interacted with HHI dummies. Lagged assets per share is the book value of assets (Compustat item #6) in the previ-
ous fiscal year divided by the number of shares in the month of the forecast (from CRSP). All right-hand side variables are lagged. The control vari-
ables include HHI dummies, the book-to-market ratio, and firm size. The book-to-market ratio and firm size are each interacted with HHI dummies. 
The HHI dummies and the Democracy dummy are defined in Table V.  Firm size is the logarithm of the book value of assets. The book-to-market 
ratio is computed as the logarithm of the ratio of the market value of equity (item #199 × item #25) over the book value of equity (item #60 + item 
#74.) All coefficients are multiplied by 100. The sample is restricted to Democracy and Dictatorship firms. Columns [1] to [3] report the coefficients 
on the Democracy dummy, while columns [4] to [6] report the coefficients on interaction terms between the Democracy dummy and HHI dummies. 
The coefficients on the intercept and control variables are not reported.  Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. The sample period is from 
1991 to 1999. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel (A): Mean Consensus Forecasts of EPS
Actual Forecast Error Actual Forecast Error
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Democracy 0.57* 0.48 0.09
(1.66) (1.25) (0.68)
Democracy x HHI (Low) 0.15 0.20 -0.05
(0.23) (0.29) (0.19)
Democracy x HHI (Medium) 0.10 0.09 0.01
(0.17) (0.16) (0.06)
Democracy x HHI (High) 1.52** 1.13* 0.39*
(2.39) (1.81) (1.80)
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071
Adj. R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.11
Panel (B): Median Consensus Forecasts of EPS
Actual Forecast Error Actual Forecast Error
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Democracy 0.57* 0.48 0.09
(1.66) (1.19) (0.72)
Democracy x HHI (Low) 0.15 0.19 -0.04
(0.23) (0.29) (0.21)
Democracy x HHI (Medium) 0.10 0.07 0.03
(0.17) (0.13) (0.12)
Democracy x HHI (High) 1.52** 1.12* 0.40*
(2.39) (1.80) (1.80)
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071
Adj. R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.11
 
Table VII 
Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Tobin’s Q 
 
This table reports the results from annual cross-sectional regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q on an intercept, the G-index, and control vari-
ables. In columns [2] to [4] the intercept, the G-index, and the control variables are interacted with HHI dummies. The last row reports the Fama-
MacBeth estimates. The G-index and the HHI dummies are defined in Tables I and V, respectively. Tobin's Q is the market value of assets divided by 
the book value of assets (Compustat item #6), where the market value of assets is the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock 
(item #24 × item #25) minus the sum of the book value of common stock (item #60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item #74). Industry-adjusted 
Tobin's Q is computed by subtracting the industry median in a given FF industry and year. Industry medians are computed using all firms in the 
Compustat universe. The control variables are firm size, which is the logarithm of the book value of assets, firm age (in logs), an S&P 500 dummy, 
and a Delaware dummy. Column [1] reports the coefficient on the G-index, while columns [2] to [4] report the coefficients on interaction terms 
between the G-index and HHI dummies. The coefficients on the intercept and control variables are not reported. The sample period is from 1990 to 
2006. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Lowest Medium Highest
Year All Firms HHI Tercile HHI Tercile HHI Tercile
[1] [2] [3] [4]
1990 -0.019** -0.004 -0.024 -0.031**
(2.26) (0.31) (1.60) (2.03)
1991 -0.031** -0.012 -0.024 -0.061***
(2.46) (0.59) (1.04) (2.71)
1992 -0.031*** -0.013 -0.027 -0.055***
(2.99) (0.73) (1.44) (2.96)
1993 -0.042*** -0.020 -0.030 -0.071***
(3.65) (1.01) (1.52) (3.46)
1994 -0.034*** -0.008 -0.034** -0.059***
(3.67) (0.53) (2.14) (3.56)
1995 -0.035*** -0.020 -0.017 -0.077***
(2.81) (0.96) (0.79) (3.36)
1996 -0.030** -0.012 -0.015 -0.068***
(2.28) (0.54) (0.68) (2.82)
1997 -0.013 -0.006 0.006 -0.049**
(0.97) (0.24) (0.27) (2.07)
1998 -0.069*** -0.028 -0.068** -0.112***
(3.69) (0.88) (1.98) (3.50)
1999 -0.116*** -0.025 -0.163*** -0.182***
(4.41) (0.56) (3.43) (4.01)
2000 -0.091*** -0.021 -0.094** -0.157***
(3.52) (0.49) (2.09) (3.44)
2001 -0.033** 0.014 -0.067*** -0.051**
(2.28) (0.58) (2.64) (1.99)
2002 -0.017 0.029 -0.037* -0.054***
(1.60) (1.61) (1.83) (2.96)
2003 -0.046*** 0.036 -0.105*** -0.078***
(3.26) (1.56) (4.18) (3.19)
2004 -0.028** -0.000 -0.026 -0.058***
(2.27) (0.02) (1.25) (2.56)
2005 -0.032** 0.004 -0.050** -0.053**
(2.53) (0.17) (2.24) (2.25)
2006 -0.019 0.011 -0.025 -0.031
(1.52) (0.50) (1.17) (1.39)
Fama-MacBeth -0.040*** -0.004 -0.047*** -0.073***
(6.10) (1.01) (4.66) (7.36)
 
Table VIII 
Tobin’s Q: Panel Regression with Clustered S.E. 
 
This table reports the results from panel regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q on an intercept, year- and industry-fixed effects, the G-index, and 
control variables. In column [2] the intercept, the G-index, and the control variables are interacted with HHI dummies. The G-index and the HHI 
dummies are defined in Tables I and V, respectively. Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is defined in Table VII. The control variables are the same as in 
Table VII. Column [1] reports the coefficient on the G-index, while column [2] reports the coefficients on interaction terms between the G-index and 
HHI dummies. The coefficients on the intercept and control variables are not reported. The sample period is from 1990 to 2006. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
[1] [2]
G-Index -0.036***
(3.46)
G-Index x HHI (Low) -0.003
(0.32)
G-Index x HHI (Medium) -0.044**
(2.03)
G-Index x HHI (High) -0.067***
(3.37)
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry-Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 20,051 20,051
Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.08
 
Table IX 
Tobin’s Q: Robustness 
 
This table reports the results of modified versions of the regressions in Table VIII. In columns [2] to [4] the intercept, the G-index, and the control 
variables are interacted with HHI dummies. The G-index and the HHI dummies are defined in Tables I and V, respectively. Industry-adjusted Tobin’s 
Q is defined in Table VII. The control variables are the same as in Table VII. In row [1] competition is measured using the HHI computed from 
Compustat as described in Table I. The modifications in rows [2] to [7] are analogous to those in rows [2] to [6] and [9] of Table III. The regression in 
row [8] uses non-industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. The regression in row [9] uses industry-fixed effects instead of firm-fixed effects. Row [10] is based 
on median (least absolute deviation) regressions instead of OLS. The p-values are computed using block bootstrapping with 200 bootstraps and 48 
blocks (one for each FF industry). The bootstrapping procedure is described in Section 4.1. Column [1] reports the coefficient on the G-index, while 
columns [2] to [4] report the coefficients on interaction terms between the G-index and HHI dummies. The coefficients on the intercept and control 
variables are not reported. The sample period is from 1990 to 2006. t-statistics (in row [10] p-values) are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Lowest Medium Highest
All Firms HHI Tercile HHI Tercile HHI Tercile
[1] [2] [3] [4]
[1] HHI (Compustat, 48 FF) -0.036*** -0.003 -0.044** -0.067***
(3.46) (0.32) (2.03) (3.37)
[2] Top 4 (Compustat, 48 FF) -0.036*** -0.005 -0.044* -0.061***
(3.46) (0.43) (1.83) (3.26)
[3] HHI (Census, Manuf. Ind.) -0.047*** -0.015 -0.041** -0.092**
(3.24) (1.06) (2.12) (2.14)
[4]Top 4 (Census, Manuf. Ind.) -0.047*** -0.013 -0.038** -0.092***
(3.24) (1.03) (2.19) (2.57)
[5] E-Index -0.103*** -0.040 -0.130*** -0.148***
(4.70) (1.23) (2.59) (4.40)
[6] ATI -0.089*** -0.022 -0.122** -0.135***
(3.15) (0.47) (1.99) (2.72)
[7] Excluding "New Economy" -0.031*** -0.001 -0.041** -0.058***
(3.42) (0.16) (2.07) (3.49)
[8] Non-industry-adjusted Tobin's Q -0.035*** -0.003 -0.044* -0.068***
(3.40) (0.22) (1.87) (3.43)
[9] Firm-Fixed Effects -0.021* 0.003 -0.018 -0.052***
(1.75) (0.30) (0.91) (2.91)
[10] Median Regression -0.007** -0.001 -0.013* -0.022***
(p=0.02) (p=0.97) (p=0.07) (p=0.00)
 
 
 
 
Table X 
Operating Performance 
 
This table reports the results from panel regressions of industry-adjusted measures of operating performance on an intercept, year- and industry-fixed effects, the G-index, and control variables. In columns [2], [4], and [6] the 
intercept, the G-index, and the control variables are interacted with HHI dummies. The G-index and the HHI dummies are defined in Tables I and V, respectively. In columns [1] and [2] operating performance is measured using the 
return on assets (ROA), in columns [3] and [4] it is measured using the net profit margin (NPM), and in columns [5] and [6] it is measured using the return on equity (ROE). ROA is net income (Compustat item #172) divided by the 
book value of assets (item #6), NPM is net income divided by sales (item #12), and ROE is net income divided by the book value of common stock (item #60). Industry-adjusted operating performance is computed by subtracting 
the corresponding industry median in a given FF industry and year. Industry medians are computed using all firms in the Compustat universe. The control variables are the same as in Table VII plus the logarithm of the book-to-
market ratio in the previous fiscal year. The book-to-market ratio is computed as the ratio of the book value of common stock (item #60) plus balance sheet deferred taxes (item #74) over the market value of common stock (item 
#24 × item #25). The coefficients are estimated using median (least absolute deviation) regressions. The p-values are computed using block bootstrapping with 200 bootstraps and 48 blocks (one for each FF industry). The 
bootstrapping procedure is described in Section 4.1. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Columns [1], [3], and [5] report the coefficient on the G-index, while columns [2], [4], and [6] report the coefficients on interaction terms 
between the G-index and HHI dummies. The coefficients on the intercept and control variables are not reported. The sample period is from 1990 to 2006. p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
G-Index -0.071*** -0.078*** -0.015
(p=0.00) (p=0.00) (p=0.56)
G-Index x HHI (Low) -0.006 -0.031 0.005
(p=0.97) (p=0.61) (p=0.68)
G-Index x HHI (Medium) -0.109*** -0.094* -0.032
(p=0.00) (p=0.08) (p=0.63)
G-Index x HHI (High) -0.140*** -0.117*** -0.085*
(p=0.00) (p=0.00) (p=0.08)
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,667 19,667 19,667 19,667 19,667 19,667
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
ROA NPM ROE
 
